Sudan: Country Profile

Pluralism in Sudan is best understood within an intersectional framework. Exclusion and marginalization are seldom practiced on only one diversity type. The intersection of race, livelihood style, ethnic background, class, urban–rural nexus, formal and informal economy, gender, religion and many other factors shape the reality of pluralism in the country. This report covers some of these diversity types, and it should be noted that each type is always connected with the others.

Sudan is one of Africa’s largest countries, with an area of 1,868,000 km2, according to the World Bank. Sudan’s borders are shared with seven countries, which are Egypt and Libya from the north, the state of South Sudan from the south, Chad and the Central African Republic from the west, Ethiopia and Eritrea from the east, and the Red Sea separates Sudan from Saudi Arabia. It has a population of 44,909,351 people. The main languages in Sudan are Arabic (official), more than 100 languages and dialects of the Nilotic languages, Niger-Kordofanian languages and Nilo-Hamitic. More than half of the population of Sudan classify themselves as Sudanese Arabs, with an African minority of more than 30 percent, resulting in a historical co-existence between the Arab and African peoples in Sudan, which has gradually blurred ethnic boundaries. However, these conflicts and challenges around Sudan’s identity returned massively during the past decade in relation to an identity crisis.

Culturally, the impact of Sudan’s geographical location, that is, North sub-Saharan Africa, cannot be denied. It is clearly reflected in the contrast of cultures due to the ethnic and cultural interactions with the neighbouring countries, where the features of the Arab identity are clear in the north and centre, and most of the population speaks Arabic, follow Islam, and mostly claim an Arabic identity. The features of the African identity appear across the nation, celebrated among some groups and denied among others. Sudan is characterized by cultural diversity and the predominance of a rural lifestyle.

Traditionally, local communities shared many qualities of peaceful co-existence. Among these is the prevalence of a collective culture, co-operation and solidarity, which may extend to include many ethnic groups or to be internal within the same group. In most of these societies, with their different religious orientations, whether they are Christian, Muslim or with traditional beliefs, the elements of collective culture are linked to a religious dimension, and the religious elements intersect with cultural diversity and unite the goals of ethnically different groups—the values of solidarity and support are the basis of social and family life in Sudan.

While regions or states were indeed allowed to exercise a great deal of power, much remained centralized, and states were not empowered financially.

Before 1989, Sudan oscillated between centralized and decentralized systems of governance. In 1994, Sudan adopted a federal system of governance. The federal system went through different stages of development. At present, there are 18 states: Blue Nile, Central Darfur, East Darfur, Gedaref, Gezira, Kassala, Khartoum, North Darfur, North Kordofan, Northern, Red Sea, River Nile, Sennar, South Darfur, South Kordofan, West Darfur, West Kordofan and White Nile. The federal system was meant as a vehicle for the devolution of powers in vast countries like Sudan. While regions or states were indeed allowed to exercise a great deal of power, much remained centralized, and states were not empowered financially. States that were not economically endowed faced challenges because the federal government seldom provides the necessary financial support. Additionally, the federal system of governance entrenched ethnicity as some states were established based on ethnic considerations.

In December 2018, Sudan entered a revolution/uprising that shifted the power dynamics of the country, and by April 2019, the Islamist government of President Omar al-Bashir was overthrown after 30 years of a tight power grip. Over the 30 years of the National Congress Party’s (NCP) rule, Sudan faced increasing hostility against its neighbours, repression, ethnic and religious polarization, and a forced process of Arabization and Islamization. The NCP was born out of the Muslim Brotherhood movement and manifested the movement’s vision of power. The history of Sudan is marked by conflicts, wars, discrimination, brutality and exclusion.

The Context

Following the overthrow of al-Bashir’s government after months of protests, army chief Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan was sworn in as head of the ruling TMC in Sudan on April 12th, 2019. Under the auspices of the AU and Ethiopia, a declaration and a constitutional document were agreed to in September 2019, along with the formation of a civilian–military government headed by Abdalla Hamdok. The agreement that was signed between the military junta and the FFC coalition is known as the Constitutional Declaration, and it governed the power allocated for each party as well as the relationship between them. It also covered many constitutional elements among which were clauses stating that Sudan was committed to human rights and the rights of all people and minorities. The Constitutional Declaration was concluded after painstaking negotiations between the military and civilians, which took place against the background of the June 3rd, 2019, sit-in massacre that led to the deaths of hundreds in front of the army headquarters. A committee was established to investigate the massacre, but to date, the case is not resolved and remains a barrier to justice. The current military leader, Lieutenant General Al-Burhan, forcefully ended the transitional government period by staging a coup in October 2021, which took the country back 30 years to the cycle of coups and dictatorships.

Following the October 25th, 2021 coup, the state of rights and freedoms in Sudan declined. Due to the declaration of a state of emergency, the suspension of the articles of the Constitutional Declaration, the internet being blocked, and the killing and imprisoning of protesters and civilians, the AU’s Peace and Security Council suspended Sudan’s membership in the continental system. The coup imposed an atmosphere of insecurity, deepened by the imprisonment of activists and the brutal torture and killing of protestors.

Sudan’s Economy

Sudan’s geographical location allows it a range of economic resources; however, these resources are not fully used or appropriately managed. According to the Trading Economics website (compiled from World Bank data), the agriculture land in Sudan was 60.31% in 2022. As of 2017, Sudan had an animal wealth population of 108,187,000, in addition to the Nile River, which borders the country’s east, and seasonal rivers. Various parts of the country have also seen recent gold mining, and according to Africa News, Sudan produced about 18 tons of gold in 2022. Despite these resources, corruption is a major challenge to Sudan’s economic prosperity. In 2019, Sudan was ranked 172 out of 180 countries in the Corruption Perceptions Index.

The gap between the rich and the poor has been one of the causes of political, economic and social instability, and the rich class expanded in it and the gap between it and the popular majority increased. Because of the business class’s overlap with the system, they did not see the sparks emanating from the furnace of that gap until it overthrew the whole system. Questions related to equality and narrowing the gap between the ‘haves and have-nots’ continue to require a lot of serious work to achieve a quantum leap in the issue of equality. In other words, making equality an issue of society and its political powers rather than a field for purely economic discussion. Sudan has been characterized as a typical country with a “resource curse,”, which means Sudan has an abundance of economic resources, however, poorly managed to address the real challenges of the country.

It is important to note that the former regime’s (NCP) economic policies depended heavily on “fossil fuel resources” while shrinking investments in agriculture and industry. The National Congress Party (NCP), in addressing the economic gap, established reforms that included reducing public spending in health and education sectors.

Sudan has been characterized as a typical country with a “resource curse,”, which means Sudan has an abundance of economic resources, however, poorly managed to address the real challenges of the country.

According to the 2022 Arab Monetary Fund’s (AMF) Joint Arab Economic Report, Sudan was one of the countries in the Arab region with the highest inflation rates, along with Yemen, Libya and Syria. According to the AMF’s 2022 report, the average per capita gross domestic product (GDP) reached USD $1.151 in 2021 with a growth rate of -30%. Sudan also recorded a high inflation rate, reaching (359.1%) in 2021. This increase is attributed to the impact of Covid-19 as well as the political atmosphere (instability) in the country that influenced the economic situation.

According to the United Nations Sudan Results Report (2018, 2019, 2020), in 2020, the inflation rate was recorded at 154 percent, and it was attributed to the continued depreciation of the Sudanese pound. This was all against the backdrop of the conditions that Sudan went through during 2019, as the rate of investment at constant prices shrank during 2019, reaching a saving rate of 5 per cent and an investment rate of 12 per cent. The poverty rate reached 46.1 per cent against the lower, middle income countries poverty line (3.20$ a day) with higher rates in rural areas.

Sudan also recorded the highest rates of gender inequality in terms of inequality in human development. Access to education and health services is still unequal with regard to quantity and quality among members of society, along with the absence of policies that facilitate access to basic services for isolated classes, the improvement of financial inclusion, and increasing access to finance and decent work. The United Nations (UN) Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia reports showed that the Sudanese economy contracted in 2019 by about 2.5 percent. Political instability led to a contraction of growth in the services sector and to a decline in real estate and business investments, while agriculture suffered from a shortage of inputs, especially fuel.

The military coup on October 25th, 2021, caused a major economic setback for Sudan, which had been in the early stages of recovery in 2021 because of reforms implemented by the transitional government. The coup resulted in paralysis across all vital sectors, increasing the suffering of citizens.

Conflicts and Discrimination in Sudan

It is important to note that Sudan suffered from inequalities between its regions and internal conflicts since 1956 when it achieved independence. Historically, many analysts claim that Sudan suffers from an identity crisis between Arabs and Africans; hence, many of the conflicts within Sudan are seen as identity conflicts. Despite the simplicity of such analysis, identity remains a main issue in Sudan.

Discrimination in Sudan happens on the grounds of racial origin, ethnicity, religion and gender, and it formed the basis for many policies in the subsequent national eras, which ignited civil wars in 1955; in 1983, in South Sudan (a former state in Sudan); in 2003, in the Darfur region; and in 2011, in the Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan; and the Blue Nile. It should be noted that governments have reneged on their commitments to undertake necessary reforms, which have undermined the realization of economic and social rights for many groups.

The major conflict that coloured Sudan’s history is the long war between what are now Sudan and South Sudan (a former Sudanese state). The media showed this conflict as religious, between Muslims and Christians. However, the war was also a result of discrimination and the colonial policy of “closed areas” that left many regions excluded from development and national imaginations. In 2005, the NCP and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (the main party fighting for the South back then) signed a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) and issued a new constitution. The CPA granted South Sudan a referendum for independence, which happened in 2011. Since then, Sudan has become stricter on the issue of diversity, as South Sudan had a majority of Christians and other religions, in addition to hundreds of ethnic groups and local languages. After the separation, former president Omar al-Bashir gave a famous speech in Gedarif in eastern Sudan, announcing Sudan as a homogenous country without diversity or minorities. The speech was a red flag against pluralism because before secession, South Sudan represented a large share of the country’s diverse groups. While the situation has changed now politically, the practices and exclusionary policies largely remain the same.

The second prominent conflict in Sudan is the war in Darfur, which started in 2003, in western Sudan. The conflict started as clashes between farmers and pastoralists before it politically escalated. The conflict escalated gradually into a war between ethnic groups known as “Arabs” and “blacks” (also known as Zourga, see note). The conflict was again simplified and misrepresented by media. As Sikainga explains, “The current Darfur conflict is a product of an explosive combination of environmental, political, and economic factors.”

It is important to mention that the Darfur region enjoys a very diverse ethnic population with inter- marriages among them. It is also very pluralistic on a linguistic level. Groups such as the Fur, Masalit, Zaghawa, Tunjur and Daju are not Arabic speakers, while the Rizeigat, Misseriya, Ta’isha, Beni Halba, and Mahamid are Arabic speakers. These are just a few of the groups, in addition to others, who come from West Africa, such as the Hausa, Fulani and Borno. According to Sikainga, all parties in the conflict were “equally indigenous, equally black, and equally Muslims.”

Several peace agreements have been mediated over the course of the Darfur conflict, but none were deemed satisfactory until recently.

The conflict made it easier for many armed groups to emerge demanding equal rights for Darfur’s population and making claims on behalf of the non-Arabic speaking groups, in particular. These armed groups include the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement. The Sudanese Army and the paramilitary RSF, previously known as Janjaweed, were active in violence against non-Arabic communities. Several peace agreements have been mediated over the course of the Darfur conflict, but none were deemed satisfactory until recently.

Against the backdrop of these conflicts, many analysts and intellectuals tried to come up with solutions and evaluations. The conflicts are, in some part, seen as an identity crisis that Sudan has suffered from since 1956. Sudan is neither an Arabic nor African nation in terms of identity. Despite its geography, Sudan has undergone a serious process of Arabization and Islamization by various rulers and governments. After Sudanese independence, the rulers sought refuge with the Arab League against the polarization of the Cold War. Subsequent governments did not change this political identity but rather emphasized it. When the Islamists took power in the 1989 coup, they imposed a “civilization project” aimed primarily at Arabizing and Islamizing the nation. They implemented the project via education, media, economy and legal reforms. The NCP’s project restructured notions of tribes, ethnic groups and family, amongst other values, and they re-politicized traditional leadership between tribes and ethnic groups.

Sudan’s Identity Within the Political-Intellectual Sphere

The failure of successive Sudanese governments since independence to manage diversity has dragged the country into repeated cycles of wars, intergroup violence and instability, where the intellectual and political debate crystallized into two lines of thought: the bloody conflict on the identity between the school of Arabism and the African or Sudanese schools and the school of national fusion, such as the “School of the Forest and the Desert.” These schools of thought both affected and were affected by the political discourses of governments as well as by opposition and armed groups. Finally, the concept of the New Sudan emerged, which spoke of a Sudan with new power formations and a novel identity; that of just the Sudanese without the inflections of the Arab and African dilemma. Language, religion, identity and citizenship are at the forefront of the agenda that currently occupies a position in the aims of the political forces that still bear arms in the Nuba Mountains/South Kordofan region, such as the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM)-Abdelaziz al-Hilu, which adheres to the discussion of “supra-constitutional principles” as an entry point for engagement in any peace process, and the Abdel Wahid al-Nur movement in the Darfur region, which is entrenched behind slogans of equal citizenship and lifting historical injustices against nationalities.

The Juba Peace Agreement, 2021

During the transitional government, a new peace agreement was signed in 2020 between the transitional government and various armed groups. The agreement seemed to be a good step toward peaceful living in Sudan. Nonetheless, it was criticized for its lack of clarity on some issues, such as the power each state would enjoy as well as the future of constitution-making. A report issued by International IDEA in 2021 about the Juba Agreement stated that

The future Darfur region will exercise a different set of powers to Blue Nile and Kordofan, and it is unclear what powers will be exercised by the rest of the federal regions. The Agreement contains a large amount of detail on the powers that specific regions will exercise but is close to silent on a range of issues including but not limited to the national government’s structure, the internal structure of federal regions and the composition of revenue sharing commissions. The Agreement provides that significant additional agreements on the federal system will have to be reached in the coming few months, which will be a major challenge.

The main parties involved in this agreement are the following:

• The transitional government before the 2021 coup, comprised of elements from the FFC and SAF. The FFC is the civilian opposition coalition responsible for the constitutional charter signed after al-Bashir’s ouster in 2019 along with the military partner (the Sudanese Army and the paramilitary RSF that was active in the Darfur conflicts).
• The Armed Struggle Movements–Darfur Path, which is a “coalition of the main armed movements in the Darfur region.” The coalition includes “the Justice and Equality Movement, the Sudan Liberation Movement (Minni Minawi), the Sudan Liberation Movement-Transitional Council, the Sudanese Alliance Movement, the Sudan Liberation Forces Alliance, and the Sudan Liberation Movement.”
• Sudan Liberation Movement–North–SRF is “connected to the South Sudanese Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and remained active in Sudan after South Sudan seceded in 2011. In 2017, the movement split into two main factions: the Malik Agar faction which signed the Juba Agreement and the Abdelaziz al-Hilu faction which has still not signed into the Agreement […]. Both factions are in the South Kordofan and Blue Nile area.”
• Masar al-Shariq (Eastern Path) is associated with the “Beja Congress, which is a political group comprising serval ethnic groups. The group has splintered, which contributed to a lack of consensus within Masar al-Shariq on the Juba Agreement. Osama Saeed [leader of the Beja Congress] signed the Eastern Sudan Track on behalf of two Beja Congress splinter groups (United People’s Front for Liberation and Justice and the Beja Congress in Opposition).”
• Masar al-Shamal (Northern Path) refers to “the Kush Liberation Movement and the North Entity […]. The Masar’s objectives include development, and displaced persons in north Sudan, Merowe and Wadi Halfa who were displaced because of dam construction.”
• Masar al-Wasat (Central Path) is a coalition of political parties and Sufi groups. The coalition was headed by the Revolutionary Democratic Front Party. Masar al-Wasat is concentrated in al-Jazira state, the White Nile, Sennar and the state of Khartoum.”
• Al-Jabaha al-Thalitha-Tamazuj (Third Front) is a “faction/wing of the SPLM.”

The transitional government aimed to start a new era for Sudan in which every group of people would be represented and seen by the state. However, the agreement did not work in this regard. One of the important challenges in terms of recognizing pluralism within the agreement was its failure to include SPLM-North, led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu. This faction of the SPLM insisted on separating religion from the state and having a secular state to compensate for the previous government’s Islamization processes. Also, the Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM) faction led by Abdel Wahid al-Nur refused any negotiations with the army faction of the transitional government. These two groups did not take part in the Juba Agreement, yet remain important for any recognition of peace in Sudan, particularly the processes of negotiating marginalization and attempts at reconciliation and compensation.

Sudan’s Regional and International Relations

Since it is independence in 1956, Sudan has not had stable relationships with its neighbours. How Sudan conducts its regional and international relations has implications on conflict and pluralism in the country. Two central factors need to be considered. First is the ambivalent status of Sudan within the AU and the Arab League, which has shaped Sudan’s relationships with its neighbours from these two blocs. For instance, Egypt perceives its national interest to be affected by developments in Sudan, and for historical reasons, Egypt looks at Sudan as its backyard. Second, Sudan’s relationships during the Cold War were affected by its ideological leanings. During the 1980s, Sudan was the biggest recipient of US foreign aid in sub-Saharan Africa. This means that the different vested interests of external actors shaped Sudan conflicts, and as such, its conflicts were never merely internal. This was highlighted by the fact that all peacemaking efforts and agreements signed during the al-Bashir regime were brokered by external actors. Sudan has, in recent years, been drawn into Gulf politics and the rivalry between Qatar, on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, on the other. Sudan’s relationship with Iran has also impacted its relations with the Gulf countries. Sudan’s relationship with the United States has been quite difficult, especially during the reign of the Islamists. The Trump administration’s announcement in December 2018 of its new Africa strategy, which included stopping the influence of China and the Russian Federation on the continent, meant that Sudan represented a challenge to this strategy, as it maintained good relations with both countries.

Relations with neighbouring countries, led by Ethiopia (e.g., the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam dispute) also play a role, especially in the aftermath of the war on the Tigray region on November 4th, 2020, and the conflict with Sudan over the lands of “al-Fashaqa.” The Tigray conflict was directly reflected in the size of the refugee flow to Sudan and the humanitarian and human rights conditions of these refugees. Following the April 15th, 2023 war, Tigray refugees were forced to leave Sudan along with hundreds of thousands of Sudanese who crossed the border into Ethiopia. Eritrea also plays a pivotal role in the stability of the states of eastern Sudan in terms of ethnic overlap and cross-border groups between the two countries. These have become of paramount importance with the regional conflicts on the Red Sea coast, and the sharp internal polarization between the local components on the guidance of the conflicts of the Horn of Africa.

Sudan’s Civil Society

In Sudan, civil society has historically been intertwined with politics and activism . Civil society, as defined by Assal, are non-state actors and include “NGOs, professional associations, trade unions, and even opposition political parties[…].” Within that scope, it is useful to shed light on the nature of civil society in Sudan in earlier times. Prior to the attainment of independence, the citizens of Sudan initiated the formation of a civil society that functioned independently of what the state dictates. Civil society invested in a heritage of togetherness rooted in Sudan’s citizens’ rural backgrounds of shared responsibility and ownership of lands and resources. This cultural foundation fostered a communal sense of responsibility for development, evident in practices such as shared harvests, governance, and crisis management. This cultural foundation manifested in the establishment of schools, reading circles, vocational training schools, trade unions, among other type of organizations. This surge of civil engagement resonated with diverse social groups, encompassing men, women, farmers, laborers, and more. This period coincided with a postcolonial initiative aimed at establishing a state. The salient point here is that for an extended period in both history and geography, Sudanese society has been characterized by a civil society based on the sharing and collective management of resources.

A sense of solidarity among Sudanese communities is deeply rooted in Sufi religious modes of thought and institutions such as Nafeer, where individuals seek the support of their tribal members, neighbours, and other community members to undertake various tasks, including construction, harvesting, and agricultural activities. This collectivity and support among the Sudanese people are grounded first in the basic tribal organization, and with urbanization transformed into a residential form of solidarity. With modernity, this collectivity also became professional.

However, Sudanese civil society underwent significant transformations in both its nature and its organizational structure, evolving from a folk development space to a politically active space, particularly during anti-colonial struggle. The conceptualization of civil society in modern times can be traced back to organizations such as the White Flag League, which laid the foundation for a “politically oriented civil society.” Civil society, through trade unions, reading circles, student unions, and other organizations, has played a significant political role during various periods of Sudan’s history. In light of this historical context, it is crucial to note that Islamists have actively restricted and monitored civil society in Sudan. Islamists cultivated a parallel Islamic civil society, fostering institutions such as monazamat alda’wa al islamia (Islamic Appeal Organization known as MADA), Quranic teaching centres, and orphans’ assistance organizations. Simultaneously, the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) imposed constraints on civic space, particularly with regard to NGOs. The HAC persistently restricted civil interventions for national and international organizations. It is important to note that control over civil society and humanitarian aid in Sudan took various forms under various bodies since 1989. When the Islamists took power in Sudan (1989) they started by dissolving and banning trade unions, national civil society organizations and various associations. Many organizations had to re-register under more control established by the 1991 Criminal Act. In 2006, new legislation was issued that gave HAC even more control over civil society organizations and it became more of a “security body.”

Subsequent to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in 2005 and to the Darfur Peace Agreement in 2006, there was a proliferation of civil society organizations, donors, and funds from around the world. A significant aspect of NGO interventions during this period was the emphasis on civic education, democracy, human rights, and peacebuilding. This era is remembered among Sudanese as an era with a margin of freedom for civil society activities. Unfortunately, it ended immediately when South Sudan seceded in 2012. However, it is important to note that despite the restrictions that were imposed on civil society, the sector remained attractive for opposition activists. Several activists joined the NGO space and, according to Hale and Kadoda, women and youth activists started to self-identify as activists rather than as members of political parties.

In the aftermath of the armed conflict that commenced in April 2023, the civil society sector experienced significant destruction.

This shift is of particular pertinence to youth who did not appreciate party politics. Since 2008, several youth groups have emerged as new actors within the sphere of civil society. These groups have taken various forms, including humanitarian initiatives such as Nafeer, Emergency Street, and Education Without Borders, as well as youth political initiatives such as Girifna (lit. “We are fed up”) and Sudan Change Now. In the wake of youth initiatives in Khartoum, the civil society landscape underwent a transformation, giving rise to two distinct trajectories. On one trajectory, youth-managed entities emerged, while on another, established NGOs were seen as representing a more traditional civil society. This distinction became more pronounced following the 2018 uprisings that led to the overthrow of former President Omar al-Bashir. The existence of limited spaces and programs within the conventional NGO structure has meant that young people remain predominantly excluded from leadership roles. Consequently, the youth frequently characterized conventional NGOs as exclusionary, elitist and centered on Khartoum. Additionally, the civil society sector with NGOs in particular have been criticized as focusing on “symptoms” rather than “causes” given that most of their work is response oriented. The reliance on external donors had made NGOs compete amongst themselves instead of cooperate.

In the aftermath of the armed conflict that commenced in April 2023, the civil society sector experienced significant destruction. A significant number of organizations were compelled to relocate or suspend their operations due to the ongoing conflict in Sudan. According to El Mahdi et al., approximately 2,900 national organizations were forced to cease their activities in the country. A limited number of organizations operated from relatively secure locations within Sudan, including Kassala, Gedarif, and Port Sudan. Nonetheless, in conflict-stricken regions such as Khartoum, youth-led initiatives persisted in their endeavors. A notable example is a group that emerged from the remnants of the uprising, known as Emergency Response Rooms, which prioritizes humanitarian aid. Another initiative, dubbed Hadreen (ḥāḍrīn), has emerged from the antecedents of youth humanitarian initiatives and is instrumental in facilitating humanitarian aid processes.
NGOs that have vacated Sudan encounter significant challenges in re-establishing their offices in the countries of exile, especially smaller organizations such as Sudanese Solidarity for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. The challenges encountered by these organizations vary according to the host countries selected. For instance, those in Egypt are confronted with a constricted civic space in the country, while others in Uganda, for example, encounter obstacles in terms of financial resources. International donors have restricted their support to human rights-focused NGOs, thereby fostering a sense of competition among these NGOs and further complicating their work. The majority of the financial resources are allocated to addressing humanitarian needs in regions affected by conflict. Consequently, a number of NGOs have transitioned to providing humanitarian assistance, despite their primary areas of expertise being human rights and civic education.

Numerous NGOs have implemented initiatives focused on peacebuilding among grassroots communities.

In light of the ongoing war in Sudan, it is imperative to explore the role of civil society in peace processes. Notwithstanding the aforementioned critiques concerning the difficulties faced by civil society, it is imperative to acknowledge its pivotal role in promoting peace during the preceding conflicts in Sudan. Numerous NGOs have implemented initiatives focused on peacebuilding among grassroots communities, including the Sudanese Initiative for Human Rights, the Sudanese Writers Union, and the Sudanese Organization for Research and Development (SORD). Nonetheless, Sudanese civil society has historically been excluded from peace negotiations. For instance, this exclusion was evident during the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Abuja Peace Agreement negotiations between the Sudanese government and the armed groups from Darfur. Currently, despite encountering polarization, NGOs have increasingly collaborated with political figures to bring an end to war. These organizations have also utilized their networks with donors and the international community to garner support for the cessation of hostilities. It is noteworthy that these organizations depend on funding from the international community, including the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which in 2024 provided approximately 70% of the funding for NGOs and humanitarian aid. The recent suspension of USAID funds and activities have had a significant impact on Sudanese NGOs. A number of NGOs that received support from USAID were compelled to cease their operations and lay off employees due to their inability to maintain payroll. Consequently, this is contributing to the struggles of NGOs in exile and poses a significant challenge for maintaining their work.

Diversity Types for the Report

Livelihood Styles

Sudan has various diverse groups who are mainly pastoralists or farmers. This diversity type reflects many of the root causes for conflicts outside urban areas. Accordingly, when we speak about pastoralists and farmers, we also speak about people who have long suffered from unequal development patterns, marginalization, internal conflicts and displacement.

Languages

As an ethnically diverse country, Sudan is also linguistically diverse. There is a connection between those who do not use Arabic as a mother tongue and marginalization. Many groups suffered from language discrimination as they were forced to adopt Arabic as an official language to get an education and jobs. Thus, groups, such as the Nubians in the North, Nuba in South Kordofan and Beja in the east, have suffered from linguistic discrimination in the state’s policies. This diversity type reflects connections between marginalization and the enforcement of Arabic and loss of languages over time. There have been several attempts by communities to preserve and teach their local languages, such as the Moro group (a subgroup from Nuba) and the Nubians in the north; however, these attempts have not been very promising. On top of this, and since the NCP made education in the Arabic language only, speaking English remained a privilege. This directly reflected who has been engaged in political processes and who got good jobs, that is, mostly those who could afford private schools. When grouping together the ethnic groups who do not use Arabic as a mother tongue, then one is referring to marginalized groups as well. Pluralism in terms of language in Sudan has been closely linked to the conflict over culture and identity and was one of the factors of the civil war. This is also a dynamic left by the colonial language policies in Africa, and African elites identified with it in the national eras. Local languages face threats that originate in wars and displacement migration, education and media, and in the media not responding to local languages, along with the poor quantity and quality of documentation.

Economy

The formal economy in Sudan is only a small section, while those in the informal market represent the majority. This report also uses the term ‘informality’ to refer to those who exist in this space of the economy. Taking the internal displacement that happened because of conflicts into consideration, most of those displaced would join the informal sector in big cities, especially Khartoum. These are largely the same groups that suffered from marginalization, poverty and displacement. The element of urban versus rural life is connected to this diversity type. In the rural areas, the focus is more on pastoralists and farmers, despite the presence of informal forms of both. In cities, the distinction becomes one between the formal and informal economy. It is about which groups work in the margins of the state, and a multi-layered process of marginalization is practiced against them either because of displacement, lack of education, language (i.e., not Arabic), colour, ethnic background, among other factors, or because of poverty. Sudan’s economy has been performing badly for many decades, except for the period 2003–10 when the economy was growing in double digits because of oil revenue and the peace agreement that was signed in 2005. Before the oil, the economy suffered under high inflation rates and US sanctions that were imposed in 1993 and continued for over two decades (they were finally lifted by President Barack Obama in 2017). Yet, the October 2021 military coup put Sudan back into international isolation, and the 2023 war shattered all hopes for the economy.

Religion

Despite suggestions to the contrary, Sudan is religiously diverse. Despite being portrayed as a Muslim country, there are groups who are discriminated against in Sudan because of their religion, such as the Nuba from South Kordofan. Also, religion intersects with marginalization in urban areas with informality and formality. There are large numbers of refugees whose identities connect to religion; for example, the South Sudanese and Ethiopians. Religion here reflects the conflict not only with South Sudan before secession in 2011 but also with the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile areas that have significant non-Muslim populations. Pew Research Center data indicated that 91 percent of the population of Sudan is Muslim, 5.4 percent Christian, 2.8 percent follow traditional religions (such as ancestral worship) and the rest follow other religions or do not belong to any religion. It must be noted that there is religious diversity among Muslims, and as such, there is conflict within the Muslim population. While Sunni Islam is the order in Sudan, within it there are many groups, including the Sufi orders and Salafi groups (this group is divided into several subgroups). Sufi and Salafi groups have differences that, at times, have led to violence. For instance in 2012 a violent incident was recorded between Salfi groups and Sufi groups during the Mawlid celebrations (The Prophet Mohammed’s birth celebrations) in Omdurman as reported in Sudanese Online website.

In 2020, some religious advocacy groups estimate that non-Muslims make up more than 13 percent of the population; most Muslims (in the absence of accurate official statistics) follow the Sunni sect, although there are great differences between the followers of the different Sunni traditions. There are small communities of the Shiite sect in Khartoum, along with a small Baha’i community, and there is still at least one Jewish family in the Khartoum area.

The Sudanese Council of Churches estimates that there are 36 Christian denominations, of which 24 are registered, and there are relatively small but well-established groups of Coptic Orthodox and Greek Orthodox in Khartoum, El Obeid in North Kordofan, River Nile State, Gezira State and the eastern parts of the country. The Ethiopian and Eritrean orthodox communities consist mostly of refugees and immigrants in Khartoum and the eastern parts of the country. Other larger Christian groups include the Roman Catholic Church, the Anglican Episcopal Church, the Special Committee of the Seventh-day Adventist Church in Sudan, and the Presbyterian Church in Sudan. Smaller Christian groups include the African Inland Church, the Armenian Apostolic Church, the Sudanese Interior Church, the Sudanese Pentecostal Church, the Seventh-day Adventist Church and Jehovah’s Witnesses.

Gender

Gender remains as a cross-cutting type throughout this report. Women are often much more discriminated against. This is very relevant when thinking of the process of Islamization that imposed one type of Islam on all people, and women were the most affected. Also, on displacement and the informal sector, women are among the largest categories that are negatively affected.

Chronology of Events

• August 18, 1955 (Torit): The outbreak of the first civil war in South Sudan.
• March 16, 1965 (Khartoum): The Round Table Conference to Solve the Problem of the South.
• February 27, 1972 (Addis Ababa): Agreement on Autonomy for the Region of Southern Sudan.
• May 16, 1983 (Bor, South Sudan): The outbreak of the second civil war in southern Sudan.
• January 25, 1992 (Frankfurt): Frankfurt Declaration grants the south the right to a referendum on self-determination.
• July 1994 (Nairobi): Intergovernmental Authority on Development Principles–Third Round, Adoption of the Right to Self- Determination for the South.
• June 23, 1995 (Asmara): The Asmara Declaration on Fundamental Issues.
• April 21, 1997 (Khartoum): Khartoum Peace Agreement (Peace from within) with factions from South Sudan.
• January 9, 2005 (Naivasha): Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
• May 5, 2006 (Abuja): Darfur Peace Agreement.
• October 14, 2006 (Asmara): Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement.
• July 14, 2011 (Doha): The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur.
• December 2018: The start of the uprising’s demonstrations.
• April 2019: The ousting of the Omar al-Bashir regime.
• June 2019: The Khartoum Massacre of protesters, which crushed the sit-in at the army headquarters.
• July 2019: Signing of a power-sharing agreement between civilians and the military junta.
• October 3, 2020 (Juba): Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan.
• October 2021: Military coup.
• April 2023: War between Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).